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CONSUMPTION OF GROCERIES

(I) INTRODUCTORY

This paper deals with sales of dry groceries in 1947. The material for the survey, as that for similar ones carried out by us in previous years, was obtained from a large number of shops specialising in dry groceries and catering for about 2 millions of registered customers. We were supplied in full with the data of turnover of 16 different foods or food groups, for which, therefore, we could compute the quantities bought and the outlay per customer. For other items the information collected was in less detail, and for these we only show figures of outlay. We were able to calculate the quantities purchased for all the groceries rationed specifically (all fats, bacon, cheese, shell eggs, sugar, jam, and tea), for three foods that were rationed on points (cooked meat,[1] dried eggs, and biscuits), for two other foods that were rationed by means of B.U.s (cake and flour), and for a further two that were unrationed (sausages and—in one group—poultry, rabbits, and game).

The number of registrations with the shops that supplied our sample was approximately the same for fats, cheese, sugar, and jam, while for bacon this figure was about 10 per cent higher. Not all of those who were registered with these shops for their other rationed groceries also bought their tea from them, but since no registration is required for the purchase of tea no precise information is available on this point. In calculating our data of average purchases per person per week we have therefore divided the quantities sold of tea by the number of registrations for all grocieries, except bacon, and in a similar way we have treated the data of sales of the remaining foods or food groups. It is obvious that the ' quantities purchased ' thus calculated do not in every instance represent the total average purchases per person, of foods such as sausages, poultry, rabbits, game, eggs, cake, and flour, as well as of tea, that are also supplied by more specialised shops. Neither, of course, can our average data of quantities and outlay indicate the pattern of sales of any single shop, since not all the shops of our sample were dealing in precisely the same commodities; in particular, poultry, game, rabbits, sausages, and cake, were sold only by some of them. However, considering the magnitude of our sample it is reasonable to assume that by dividing the total turnover of these items by the number of 'main customers'—*viz.*, the number of customers registered with all the shops for most of their specifically rationed groceries—we obtain a figure that fairly indicates the respective average purchases per person from shops specialising in groceries.

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[1] The cheapest kinds of cooked meat were unrationed, but comparatively little of these seems to have been sold.

Since an official ration period comprises four weeks, a year contains thirteen ration periods. A ration year as defined by the Ministry of Food begins and ends in July, but since our material was supplied for a calender year, we have counted in this paper the ration periods from the first period starting in January to the last one starting in December and ending in January of the following year, numbering these from 1 to 13. Our 'half yearly' averages of weekly purchases are based on the data for the first seven and the subsequent six ration periods of a calendar year, so as to obviate the necessity of bisecting a ration period. The six ration periods representing our second 'half' of the year always start at the beginning of the official ration year.

(2) AVERAGE PURCHASES PER WEEK

In Table I we consider the weekly purchases per 'main customer', as defined above[1], during the four bi-annual periods of 1946 and 1947. The average quantities bought of specific foods during these periods indicate no clear general trend, the most noticeable changes occurring in the purchases of bacon, eggs, sugar, and flour. The average purchases of bacon declined in 1947 owing to reductions in the ration, first, in January, from three to two ounces, and, secondly, in October, from two ounces to one ounce. The number of shell eggs bought per week was in both years determined by the seasonal fluctuations in the egg ration. The ordinary cheese ration was cut from three ounces to two ounces per week in May 1946, but this decline is not fully reflected in the data in Table I, partly because the special ration[2] remained unaltered, partly because small quantities of more expensive cheeses rationed on 'points' and sold by weight became available[3], and, lastly, because apparently more people bought their full allowance of cheese when the ration was only two ounces than when it was three ounces. It is also possible that a slight relative increase in the quantities sold per ordinary ration was due to the difficulty of precisely weighing out very small cuts of cheese. More sugar was made available to the housewife in 1947 than in 1946, while, on the other hand, the sales of flour were highest during the first half of 1946, *i.e.*, prior to the—already expected—rationing of bread and flour. An upward movement is apparent for the prices of a number of foods in Table I, but those of butter, bacon, shell eggs, cheese, and sugar, came down in 1947, owing to increased Government subsidies for these foods.

The average weekly outlay in 1946 and 1947 per main customer, on the foods enumerated in Table I and on a variety of unspecified groceries, thrown

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[1] In the text of this paper we shall frequently substitute for 'main customer' simply 'customer' or 'person'.

[2] Given to certain heavy workers, agricultural labourers, and vegetarians.

[3] Sales of camembert and similar boxed cheeses are not included with our data for cheese.

TABLE I

Purchases of Groceries per Main Customer per Week

	1946 Jan. 7—July 21		1946–47 July 22—Jan. 5		1947 Jan. 6—July 20		1947–48 July 21—Jan. 4	
	Quantity[1]	*Price*[2] *d.*	Quantity[1]	*Price*[2] *d.*	Quantity[1]	*Price*[2] *d.*	Quantity[1]	*Price*[2] *d.*
(*a*) *Fats* :								
Butter	2.7	*20*	2.6	*18*	2.7	*17½*	2.6	*17*
Margarine	2.9	*9*	3.0	*9*	2.9	*9*	3.2	*9*
Cooking Fats	1.0	*9*	0.9	*9*	0.9	*11*	0.9	*12*
(*b*) *Protein Foods* :								
Bacon	3.0	*24*	3.0	*24*	2.0	*24*	1.6	*21½*
Cooked Meat	0.6	*20*	0.9	*25*	1.1	*27½*	0.8	*26¼*
Sausages	1.7	*12½*	2.2	*12½*	2.0	*13*	1.6	*13½*
Poultry and Rabbits	0.1	*22½*	0.3	*32¾*	0.3	*33¾*	0.4	*37¼*
Eggs, shell	1.1	*2*	0.5	*2*	1.2	*1¾*	0.7	*1¾*
Eggs, dried	0.5	*1¼*	0.7	*1½*	0.5	*2¼*	0.6	*2½*
Cheese	2.8[3]	*13*	2.4[3]	*13¼*	2.4[3]	*12*	2.5[3]	*11*
(*c*) *Carbohydrate Foods* :								
Sugar	9.8	*4*	10.9	*4*	10.1	*3½*	12.2	*3½*
Jam and Marmalade	2.5	*12½*	2.2	*13¼*	2.2	*14¼*	2.7	*15½*
Cake	1.5	*16¼*	1.5	*17¼*	1.5	*19¼*	1.5	*21½*
Biscuits	2.1	*13*	1.8	*14½*	1.9	*16*	1.8	*17¾*
Flour	5.3	*3*	2.4	*3*	2.9	*3*	2.8	*3¼*
(*d*) *Tea* :	1.6	*42½*	1.7	*42½*	1.7	*43¼*	1.5	*48*

[1] Expressed in ounces, except for eggs (in shell and dried), which are given in numbers.
[2] Eggs in shell and dried, per egg ; all other foods, per lb.
[3] Including all special rations and ' points ' rationed cheeses sold by weight.

together in our group of ' sundries ', is given in Table II. This outlay shows a steep rise from the first half of 1946 to the second half of 1947, which, however, is practically accounted for by the rise in the expenditure on unspecified groceries—foods either rationed on points or unrationed, and condiments. A slight decline in the expenditure on first class protein foods (group *b*) and a slight increase in that on carbohydrate foods (group *c*) can be observed in the second half of 1947. The outlay on tea remained constant in spite of the rise in the price of tea in the second half of 1947, since the quantity bought per customer was reduced in proportion, as a result of the decrease in the weekly tea ration from 2½ ounces to 2 ounces[1].

(3) PURCHASES OF FATS AND OF CERTAIN PROTEIN FOODS

The data in Tables I and II supply a truthful enough picture of the average purchases, but the figures involved are small, and in spite of very considerable changes in prices in the course of the two years expenditure on the three groups of specified foods appears almost static. If, however, we consider the sales of individual items in some more detail, we can obtain a good deal of interesting information regarding the supply of groceries and the demand for them within the limits imposed by rationing and general scarcity. In Table III we have grouped together what may appear a somewhat incongruous assembly of foods, *viz.*, the rationed fats (butter, margarine, and cooking fats), cooked meat, which was rationed on ' points ', and sausages, which were unrationed; but the reason for this arrangement will soon become clear.

First, let us consider only the purchases of fats. The butter ration could always be exchanged for an equal quantity of margarine. The maximum amount of butter per person per week amounted to three ounces from ration period 1 to ration period 11; it then fell to 2 ounces. The combined ration of butter and margarine was six ounces per week throughout the year, while the ration of cooking fat was one ounce.

It appears from the figures in Table III that during the first six ration periods of 1947 not all the customers bought their full allowance of butter, but that they did so from period 7 onward; the slight deficiencies in the uptake of the ration indicated by some of the figures for butter in the second half of the year represent in every case less than 2 per cent of the total possible turnover of butter for the respective month. The purchase of the full butter ration by practically everyone from period 7 onward is not directly connected with the reduction in the price of butter, by 2d. a lb., which occurred already in ration period 5, and which in any case only saved three farthings on two rations. It is more likely that there was some causal connection between the increased purchases of butter and the decreased purchases of meat products, enforced upon the housewife by reduced supplies of meat. During period 7 the weekly meat ration went down from 1s. 4d. to 1s. 2d. worth of meat, and already in period 6 there was a decline in the

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[1] From the beginning of ration period 8.

TABLE II

Weekly Expenditure on Various Types of Groceries

	Per Main Customer							
	1946				1947			
	1st Half		2nd Half		1st Half		2nd Half	
	s.	d.	s.	d.	s.	d.	s.	d.
(*a*) Fats		5½		5¼		5½		5½
(*b*) Protein Foods[1]	1	0¾	1	1½	1	1¾	1	0
(*c*) Carbohydrate Foods		8¾		8½		8½		9¾
(*d*) Tea		4½		4½		4½		4½
(*e*) Sundries[2]	1	3¼	1	6½	1	9	2	0¾
Total (*a*)—(*e*)	3	10¾	4	2¼	4	5¼	4	8½

[1] Including evaporated and condensed milk, but excluding dried Household milk, which is included under ' Sundries '.

[2] Including tinned foods, dried legumes, dried fruit, cereals, syrup, honey, cocoa, fancy foods, condiments, fruit squashes, and small amounts of salad vegetables (cucumbers, tomatoes, radishes, and lettuce).

TABLE III

Weekly Purchases of Fats, Cooked Meat, and Sausages

Ration Period (1947)	Per Main Customer Butter	Margarine	Cooking Fats	Cooked Meat	Sausages
	oz.	oz.	oz.	oz.	oz.
1 ...	2.8	2.8	0.9	1.2	2.0
2 ...	2.7	2.9	0.9	1.0	2.0
3 ...	2.7	3.0	0.9	1.5	2.0
4 ...	2.6	3.0	0.9	1.1	2.0
5[1] ...	2.7	3.0	0.9	1.1	2.1
6 ...	2.8	2.9	0.9	1.1	1.8
7[2] ...	2.9	3.0	0.9	0.8	1.8
8 ...	2.9	3.0	1.0	0.8	1.5
9[3] ...	3.0	3.0	0.9	0.7	1.6
10 ...	2.9	2.9	1.0	0.7	1.7
11[4] ...	2.9	3.0	0.9	0.9	1.7
12[5] ...	2.0	3.7	1.0	0.7	1.7
13 ...	2.0	3.7	0.9	0.7	1.8

[1] Price of butter reduced by 2d. a lb.

[2] Weekly meat ration reduced from 1/4 to 1/2.

[3] Weekly meat ration reduced from 1/2 to 1 shilling.

[4] Weekly bacon ration reduced from 2 oz. to 1 oz.

[5] Weekly butter ration reduced from 3 oz. to 2 oz. ; weekly ration of butter and margarine unaltered at 6 oz. per person.

supply of cooked meat and of sausages. It is not, of course, possible to ascertain whether the increased purchases of butter represent increases in the total consumption of rationed fats by those who made them. It seems quite likely that some of those who always bought their full fat ration but previously replaced part of the butter by margarine were now obtaining their full share of the semi-luxury, butter, in order to compensate the family for the sudden reduction in the semi-luxury, meat, while some others who before bought their full allowance of butter but not of margarine were now also eating their full ration of margarine, thus, *e.g.*, making up for the loss of sausages for breakfast.

The data for sausages and cooked meat in Table III illustrate the shortage of meat which became apparent in the summer of 1947. The supply of meat for making sausages fell off prior to the first as well as to the second reduction in the meat ration, which took place in period 7 and period 9 respectively. When, in period 9, the weekly meat ration had been reduced to one shilling's worth of meat per person over 5 years old, the supply of meat for sausages slightly improved, and when, in period 11, the bacon ration was halved, amounting now to only one ounce per week, a little more meat was supplied during that period for the manufacture of cooked meat, the increase in the average purchases of cooked meat by 0.2 ounce per person per week being apparently wholly due to an increase in the sales of home-produced cooked meat, which was cheap and unrationed. Most of the cooked meat on sale was imported as such, and the downward trend in the sales of cooked meat indicates reduced supplies as a result of reduced imports. In the course of 1947 the ' points ' values of a number of cooked meat products were slightly raised at the beginning of period 7 and again of period 10. This did certainly not affect the demand in period 10, and it is unlikely that it accounts even for part of the reduction of sales in period 7; for the ' points ' cost of cooked meat was already very high, and an additional ' point ' per quarter-pound would scarcely have deterred a potential purchaser.

In Table I it will have been noticed that the average purchases of eggs, both in shell and dried, differed little in 1946 and 1947. In Table IV the average purchases of all eggs are given for each ration period of 1947. Eggs in shell were rationed specifically, the ordinary ration varying with seasonal changes in supply, while children up to the age of 2 years and people suffering from certain diseases could obtain their eggs every week. We have not at our disposal the data that would enable us to make adjustments so as to eliminate the effect of these priority supplies on our figures. On the other hand, some of the people who obtained all their other rationed groceries from the shops of our sample kept their own poultry or bought their eggs from elsewhere, a fact for which we could make no allowance since we have no statement of the total number of registrations for eggs. However, from a sample taken in a previous year it appeared as though for all the shops that supplied our data these two biases about cancel out.

Dried eggs were rationed on ' points '. It will be noticed that neither changes in the ' points ' value of dried eggs nor a reduction in the total weekly ' points ' allowance per person[1], had any effect on the sales of dried eggs. It may, however, appear as though the increase in the price of dried eggs from 1s. 9d. to 2s. 6d. per packet of 12 eggs, at the beginning of ration period 3, exercised for a time a depressing effect on the sales ; but this is highly improbable. A similar falling off in the demand for dried eggs could be observed also in previous years during those periods when the supply of eggs in shell was more plentiful, even while dried eggs were rationed specifically so that no alternative rationed food was available for those who did not buy their full allowance of dried eggs.

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[1] *Cf.* Table VII.

Table IV
Weekly Purchases of Eggs in Shell and of Dried Eggs

Ration Period (1947)	Per Main Customer Shell Eggs Nos.	Dried Eggs Nos.	Price Per Packet of 12 Eggs s.	 d.	'Points' Per Packet of 12 Eggs
1	0.7	0.7	1	9	10
2	1.0	0.7	1	9	10
3	1.1	0.6	2	6	10
4	1.5	0.4	2	6	10
5	1.7	0.3	2	6	8
6	1.4	0.3	2	6	8
7	1.0	0.4	2	6	8
8	0.8	0.5	2	6	8
9[1]	0.6	0.6	2	6	8
10	0.6	0.6	2	6	10
11	0.7	0.7	2	6	10
12	0.8	0.7	2	6	10
13	0.6	0.6	2	6	10

[1] Total number of 'points' per person per week reduced from 8 to 7.

Table V
Weekly Rations and Purchases of Sugar and Jam

Ration Period (1947)	Purchases p. Main Customer Sugar oz.	 Jam oz.	*Ord. combined Rations of Sugar and Jam* *oz.*	*Special Issues*
1	9.0	2.1	*12*	—
2	9.1	2.1	*12*	—
3	9.2	2.2	*12*	—
4	9.3	2.3	*12*	—
5	12.0	2.5	*12*	*4 oz. sugar*
6	9.5	2.2	*12*	—
7	12.6	2.3	*12*	*4 oz. sugar*
8	14.2	2.4	*14*	*4 oz. sugar*
9	14.4	2.4	*14*	*4 oz. sugar*
10	11.2	2.3	*14*	—
11	10.9	4.6	*14*	*4 oz. jam*
12	9.9	2.1	*12*	—
13	12.7	2.4	*12*	*4 oz. sugar*

Table VI
Weekly Purchases of Biscuits and Cake

Ration Period (1947)	Per Main Customer Biscuits Quantity bought oz.	 *Price per lb.* *s. d.*	 Cake Quantity bought oz.	 *Price per lb.* *s. d.*
1	1.6	*1 3*	1.5	*1 5¼*
2	1.5	*1 3*	1.3	*1 5¾*
3	1.8	*1 3¼*	1.5	*1 6¼*
4	1.9	*1 3½*	1.5	*1 7½*
5	2.2	*1 4*[1]	1.5	*1 8½*
6	2.1	*1 5½*	1.4	*1 8¾*
7	2.0	*1 5½*	1.5	*1 8½*
8	1.9	*1 5½*	1.5	*1 8¾*
9	1.8	*1 5½*	1.5	*1 9*
10	1.9	*1 5¾*[2]	1.5	*1 9*
11	1.7	*1 5¾*	1.5	*1 9¼*
12	1.8	*1 5¾*	1.5	*1 11*
13	1.9	*1 6½*	1.5	*1 10¼*

[1] 'Points' value of chocolate biscuits reduced from 20 to 16 a lb.

[2] 'Points' value of sweet biscuits (excl. chocolate biscuits) reduced from 12 to 10 a lb.

(4) Purchases of Carbohydrate Foods and Expenditure on Unspecified Groceries

The average weekly purchases per person of sugar amounted to 10.4 ounces in 1946 and to 11.2 ounces in 1947, while the corresponding purchases of jam were 2.4 ounces and 2.5 ounces. The average purchases of these two foods in the 13 ration periods of 1947 are shown in Table V, against the quantities available per ration and special issue. From period 8 to period 11 the combined weekly ration of sugar and jam was 14 ounces, while for all other periods it was 12 ounces. Special issues of sugar were made in five of the thirteen periods, amounting each time to a pound per person, and there was also a special issue of a pound of jam in period 11.

It will be noticed that in the course of 1947 a gradually increasing number of people took up their full ration of sugar and jam when the maximum total that could be purchased was not more than 12 ounces per week, until, in period 12, every customer bought his full 12 ounces. In ration period 4 the purchases fell short of this possible maximum by less than 3.5 per cent, but when in period 5 an extra pound of sugar became available, the actual sales only reached 90.5 per cent of the potential sales. In period 6 the total allowance again came down to 12 ounces, of which 97.5 per cent were bought, while of the 16 ounces weekly in the next period a little over 93 per cent were taken up. It is somewhat surprising that there was no noticeable decline in the effective marginal demand—*viz.*, the marginal demand that can find expression within the limits of the fixed individual ration—in periods 8 and 9, when the possible weekly purchases per person were 18 ounces, for again as much as 92 and 93 per cent of the combined allowance of sugar and jam were bought. It may be that the increased consumption of sugar was a counterpart to the reduced supply of other calorific foods, in particular of potatoes, which were scarce in the second half of 1947 and became rationed at 3 lb. per person per week at the beginning of November.

In Table VI are set out the average weekly quantities bought per ‘ main customer ’ of cake and biscuits, during the 13 ration periods of 1947. Biscuits were rationed on ‘ points ’, and cake was rationed by means of B.U.s, one lb. of cake requiring 2 B.U.s. The variations that occurred in the average amounts purchased of these foods were due solely to changes in supply and bore no relation to changes in the ‘ points ’ value of biscuits or changes in the prices of cake and biscuits. Chocolate biscuits, the ‘ points ’ value of which was reduced from 20 to 16 a pound in period 5, represented too small a proportion of the total sales of biscuits to account for the rise in average sales of biscuits from period 4 to period 5, by nearly 16 per cent.

The average expenditure on ‘ sundries ’—*i.e.*, miscellaneous groceries —shown in Table II, exhibits a rise of over 62 per cent from the first half of 1946 to the second half of 1947. In Table VII we have analysed these data of expenditure in some detail. Since most of the outlay on foods rationed on ‘ points ’ occurs in this group, we show for each of the ration periods

TABLE VII

Weekly Allowance of ' Points ' and Outlay on Sundries

Ration Period	1946 ' Points '[1]	1946 Sundries Outlay[2] s. d.	1947 ' Points '[1]	1947 Sundries Outlay[2] s. d.
1	5	1 1½	8	1 5½
2	5	1 2	8	1 8
3	6	1 3½	8	1 8½
4	6	1 3¼	8	1 9¼
5	6	1 4	8	1 10½
6	6	1 4¼	8	1 10¼
7	8[3]	1 5½	8	2 0
8	8	1 5¾	8	2 1½
9	8	1 6¼	7	2 0
10	8	1 6½	7	1 11¼
11	8[4]	1 5¼	7	1 11
12	8	1 7¼	7	2 1
13	8[5]	1 8½	7	2 4¼

[1] Per person. [2] Per ' main customer '.
[3] 1 B.U. = 1 ' point ' ; 1 ' point ' = 1 B.U.
[4] 1 B.U. = ½ ' point ' ; 1 ' point ' = 1 B.U.
[5] B.U..s no longer exchangeable ; 1 ' point ' = 1 B.U.

TABLE VIII

Nutritive Values of Groceries

	Unit	Calories	Protein gm.
Butter	oz.	211	—
Margarine	oz.	218	—
Cooking Fat	oz.	253	—
Bacon	oz.	106	3.2
Cooked Meat	oz.	71	4.3
Sausages	oz.	73	3.0
Poultry and Rabbits ...	oz.	29[1]	4.2[1]
Eggs, shell	egg	78	6.2
Eggs, dried	egg[2]	68	5.4
Cheese	oz.	117	7.1
Milk, tinned	pt.[3]	340	18.0
Sugar	oz.	108	—
Jam	oz.	71	0.1
Cake	oz.	88	2.0
Biscuits	oz.	136	2.0
Flour	oz.	99	3.3

[1] Unweighed average. [2] Reconstituted.
[3] Reconstituted to consistency of fresh milk.

of the two years the total number of ' points ' available and the amount spent on ' sundries ', per person per week. No simple relation can be expected between the outlay on ' sundries ' and the ' points ' allowance per person, not only because part of this outlay goes to buy unrationed groceries, but, also, because frequent changes in the ' points ' values of foods varied the ' purchasing power ' of the weekly ' points ' ration. There were, in particular, rises in the ' points ' values of a considerable number of foods in July, 1946, when the weekly allowance of ' points ' was increased from 6 to 8. The rationing of bread and flour started at the same time, and all those cereals that previously had been unrationed were then placed on ' points '. However, the halving of the 'points' value of a B.U. in period 11 of 1946 and the eventual suspension of the exchangeability of B.U.s for ‘ points ’ in period 13 of that year, seem to have had some checking effect on the total expenditure on ‘ sundries ’, which also appears to have experienced a suspension of its upward trend by the reduction of the total allowance of ‘ points ’ from 8 to 7, in period 9 of 1947. There is, of course, always a tendency for increased purchases of certain fancy foods just before Christmas; but the difference in the outlay on ‘ sundries ’ in period 12 and period 13 of 1946 amounted to only 1¼d., and from period 13 to period 1 of 1947 it declined by 3d.

Yet in the following period this outlay rose again to nearly as much as it had been in the last period of 1946, and, in spite of occasional oscillations, there was on the whole a rapid increase in the expenditure on sundries over the 26 periods considered in Table VII. Since of the foods rationed on ‘ points ’ the more expensive ones are also costly in ‘ points ’, this rise in expenditure cannot be taken as an indication of increased purchases of such foods. However, the prices of many foods in general demand that are included in this group, were raised in the course of 1946 and 1947. Moreover, the rationing of cereal products in common use, from July 1947, stimulated the demand for certain unrationed and rather expensive fancy foods that, to some extent, could take their place. There is no reason to assume that the increased outlay bought a substantially increased amount of nutriment.

(5) Nutritional Intake from Groceries

Since we are lacking sufficiently detailed data of sales for the group of ‘ sundries ’ it is not possible to assess with any degree of precision the nutritional intake from the foods in this group; but it can be computed as regards the foods in the other three groups. In Table VIII are shown the approximate values[1] for calories and protein of all the specified groceries with which we are concerned in this survey. These data have been employed for our calculations for Table IX.

The average figures of calories obtained for the fats (group *a*), are about the same for all the four periods, the variations in the index of outlay being due, first, to the decrease in the price of butter and, secondly, to the increase in the price of cooking fats and the slight rise in the average purchases of butter. The indices for the foods supplying animal protein (group *b*) show substantial fluctuations. The decline in the protein index from 100 to 90, from the first half of 1946 to the second half of 1947, represents a loss of 5 grammes of animal protein per person per week from these foods, and the decline in the calorie index over the same period from 100 to 84 a similar loss of 160 calories. This is not, of course, much, but the total amount of calories supplied by the foods in group (*b*) was in any case small, amounting, as the percentage figures in Table IX show, to only roughly a fifth of the total calories derived from the three food groups. The bulk of the calories was provided by the foods in group (*c*). The contrasting movements of the indices of calories and of protein of group (*c*) reflect the decreased purchases of flour

[1] According to : Medical Research Council, *War Memorandum No. 14,* H.M.S.O., 1945.

Table IX

Nutritive Values and Expenditure

	Indices of Calories	Indices of Protein	Indices of Outlay	% of Total Calories	% of Total Protein	% of Total Outlay
	(*1st Half of 1946=100*)					
(*a*) *Fats* :						
1946 1st Half	*100*	*100*	*100*	31.4	—	20.8
1946 2nd Half	98	—	93	32.8	—	19.1
1947 1st Half	98	—	96	33.3	—	19.5
1947 2nd Half	101	—	98	32.9	—	20.2
(*b*) *Protein Foods* :[1]						
1946 1st Half	*100*	*100*	*100*	21.6	67.0	47.0
1946 2nd Half	98	96	107	22.6	76.9	50.0
1947 1st Half	94	99	109	21.9	75.1	49.8
1947 2nd Half	84	90	94	18.9	73.9	44.1
(*c*) *Carbohydrate Foods* :						
1946 1st Half	*100*	*100*	*100*	47.0	33.0	32.2
1946 2nd Half	89	59	97	44.6	23.1	30.9
1947 1st Half	88	66	98	44.8	24.9	30.7
1947 2nd Half	99	64	111	48.2	26.1	35.7
Total (*a*)–(*c*) :						
1946 1st Half	*100*	*100*	*100*	100.0	100.0	100.0
1946 2nd Half	94	84	101	100.0	100.0	100.0
1947 1st Half	93	88	103	100.0	100.0	100.0
1947 2nd Half	97	82	101	100.0	100.0	100.0

Total (*a*)–(*c*)	Nutritional Values Bought per Main Customer per Week: Calories	Protein (gm.) Total	Protein (gm.) *Animal*[2]	Outlay s.	Outlay d.	Outlay on Sundries s.	Outlay on Sundries d.
1945 1st Half	4,580	75.0	*54.1*	2	4	1	1
1946 1st Half	4,640	75.7	*50.7*	2	3	1	3¼
1946 2nd Half	4,365	63.6	*48.9*	2	3¼	1	6½
1947 1st Half	4,290	66.6	*50.0*	2	3¾	1	9
1947 2nd Half	4,485	61.8	*45.7*	2	3¼	2	0¾

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[1] Including evaporated and condensed milk, but excluding dried Household milk, which is included under ' Sundries ' (group *d*).

[2] Derived from the foods in group *b*.

and the increased purchases of sugar, this latter food supplying calories but no protein.

It has already been mentioned that in the first half of 1946 purchases of flour were exceptionally high owing to the general anticipation of rationing of bread and flour. In 1945 the average weekly purchases of flour amounted, for each ration period, to approximately 4 ounces per week, as against the weekly average of 5.3 ounces for the first half of 1946. The difference in calories and protein accounted for by this is, however, too small to cause any serious distortion of our indices. For the sake of comparison we have included in the lower part of Table IX the absolute figures of calories, protein, and expenditure, per ' main customer ', for the first half of 1946. It will be seen that the average figures of calories and total protein are about the same for this period and for the first half of 1946, but that approximately 3½ grammes more of animal protein were obtained per person per week in the first half of 1945 than in the corresponding period of 1946.

With the total outlay on groups (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) is compared the outlay on ' sundries ' (group *e*). While the outlay on the three groups of specified foods shows only very slight changes from period to period, that on ' sundries' nearly doubled from the first half of 1945 to the second half of 1947, raising the total weekly expenditure per person on all the groceries including tea, from 3s. 8½d. to 4s. 8½d., or from 100 to 127.

(6) CONCLUSIONS

Our survey of the sales of groceries in 1946 and 1947 indicates that the weekly purchases per person from grocery shops yielded the smallest total of calorific foods in the first half of 1947 and the smallest amount of protein foods in the second half of that year, the decline in the amount of protein foods reflecting mainly the reduced supply of bacon and other meat products.

Changes in the allowance of ' points ' per person and changes in the ' points ' value of foods seem to have had no effect on the purchases of dried eggs, cooked meat, and biscuits, although they probably modified the pattern of expenditure on other groceries for the turnover of which we possess insufficient details to enable us to draw a definite conclusion. The outlay on these latter foods together with the outlay on unrationed groceries shows, for the two years under survey, a steep upward trend, which only seems to have been stayed intermittently by reductions in the total number of ' points ' available per person.

From the first half of 1946 to the second half of 1947 the prices of butter, bacon, eggs in shell, and sugar, were reduced, while those of cooking fats, cooked meat, dried eggs, jam, cake, biscuits, and tea, rose substantially. No indication could be found that either downward or upward changes in prices had any effect on the quantities purchased of these foods, all of which were either rationed or generally very scarce, so that there probably still remained a very large unsatisfied demand for them.

T. SCHULZ.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE CAPITAL LEVIES IN THE NETHERLANDS

Much has been written about the aims of the capital levies in the Netherlands. Nevertheless a great deal of misunderstanding still exists regarding these measures. No practical experience was available in this country and, as happens quite often in political economy, when practical arguments are lacking theoretical findings are very likely to be applied, especially when the country concerned is in a chaotic state. Although the money ' purge ' in the Netherlands has not yet been finished, its end is within sight and part of the capital profits tax has already been cashed. However, a general opinion as to the results obtained by the money ' purge ' can already be formulated. For this purpose it is useful to compare the expectations regarding the reform and their practical realisation.

It is not the aim of this article to give a complete survey of all the measures taken by the Minister of Finance in order to restore the monetary system, but to present a general view of the most important problems, which have arisen when the levies were being put into execution.

1. The Financial Legacy of War

The acts of a ruthless invader and the ravages caused by the fighting armies inflicted considerable damage upon the Netherlands, as upon many other belligerents. The decrease in national wealth from September 1939 to May 1945 amounted to about fl. 8.1 milliard at 1939 prices, not taking into account valuables, gold and foreign currency investments. This represents a loss of almost one-third of the real national wealth. It was not only material productive capacity that had been curtailed, but labour potential had also suffered. The general production index of industry (excluding the building trade) decreased from 111 in 1939 to 43 at the beginning of 1945 (taking as a basis 1938=100). However, the material poverty of the Dutch people which these figures imply was hidden by the financial policy of the occupying power. Exports to Germany, whether voluntary or not, were not paid for in goods, but in guilders, and these guilders had to be provided by the money-creating institutions. In this manner the Netherlands Bank had, at the end of the occupation, a claim in marks upon Germany amounting to fl. 4.5 milliard after forced writing-off had taken place upon this claim up to an amount of about fl 1.5 milliard. The payment of the occupation costs, amounting to fl. 8 milliard, was financed for the greater part through the creation of money.[1] Thus money in circulation rose between the end of 1939 and May 1945 from fl. 2.7 milliard to fl. 10.2 milliard. The floating national debt showed a corresponding increase from fl. 0.5 milliard (December 1939) to fl. 6.2 milliard (June 1945). The consolidated national debt showed a similar development during the same period and rose from fl. 3.4 milliard to fl. 6.4 milliard and the other state obligations increased by an amount of fl. 1.4

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[1] The occupation government had Dutch banknotes printed on their own behalf and on that of the occupation army.

milliard (of which fl. 0.7 milliard was foreign credit). The debt of the banking system and the state, which was not balanced by goods, thus rated unfavourably as compared with the remaining material wealth. The overflow of money led to a floating purchasing power, which threatened the price level. The surplus of state debts put the state budget under heavy pressure. Finally, the war brought about an arbitrary and considerable shift in capital and income distribution. Justice prompts the cancellation of these arbitrary changes as far as possible. When a war has been fought for the benefit of the people as a whole, then the war damage, which has been inflicted unequally upon the citizens, must be borne by all.

Immediately after the liberation the Netherlands Government accordingly undertook to grant indemnities towards the damage brought about by the war, based on the price level of May 1940. The funds needed for this purpose were estimated at a minimum of fl. 3 milliard. The result was that the national debt on the day of the armistice had increased to the colossal amount of fl. 22.5 milliard as against just over fl. 3.9 milliard in 1939.

Therefore the problem that had to be solved after the liberation had a three-fold aspect: (i) reduction of the excess monetary circulation, (ii) decrease of the excess of the national debt, (iii) readjustment in capital distribution.

2. Possibilities of Financial Recovery

A decrease in the money surplus could only be obtained through the destruction of money. The destruction of money, when a certain balance already exists between money and goods, leads to an undesirable adaptation process with all its disadvantages. However, such a balance between money and the volume of goods was non-existent in the Netherlands at the time of the liberation. Through price controls, rationing and the wage stop it was possible to control part of the economic process. In this way the floating purchasing power could only make itself felt in the then still very limited free sector of economic life. It was only at that moment that it was possible to destroy money without impairing the normal financing process. The obvious method was the withdrawal of all banknotes and the blocking of all banking accounts with a gradual de-blocking in so far as reasonable of the financing needs of recovery made it necessary. Part of the blocked amounts would finally have to be removed when it was shown that the financing of current income needed fewer funds.

Apart from the undesirable method of inflation, the surplus debt could only be removed by the state by way of cancellation of the debt paper or through redemption. If such an annulment of the national debt or a destruction of money took place, those who had invested their capital in government securities, banknotes or deposits, would be at a great disadvantage as compared with the (incidental) holders of real capital assets. The redemption of the state debts would considerably augment the financing needs of the Government budget.

However, an equitable decrease of the nominal debt titles could only be brought about by a redistribution of real wealth. This could only be achieved through a general capital levy, the proceeds of which were to be used to redeem the national debt. The standards applied to such a capital levy might vary. If it were the aim of the levy to cancel the changes in capital distribution which took place during the war, a capital profits tax was the most suitable instrument. If the proceeds of such a levy were not adequate, then a direct progressive levy on the capital owned by individuals became necessary.

3. Capital Profits Tax and Capital Levy

The arbitrary profit possibilities created by the war led to haphazard changes in capital distribution, but on the other hand the destruction of parts of capital led to arbitrary losses. To impose a tax which at the end of the war would completely eliminate the injustice brought about by the war was impossible. For this purpose it would be necessary to tax all those profits made during the war which were above the average, and to subsidise all those which were below the average. Therefore it was usual to advocate only an ' excess profits ' tax. It is difficult after some time has elapsed to trace high war profits, especially when they have already been spent. At the end of the war it was, however, possible to establish where increases in capital had taken place. It was clear that such a capital profits tax would discriminate against those who had saved diligently during the war as compared with those who had lived beyond their means.

In the actual scheme the capital increase is determined by the difference between the capital on May 1st, 1940 (according to the amount indicated on the capital tax form valid at that time[1]) and the capital on December 31st, 1945. Difficulties arose in the valuation of the different capital components. As the prices of the different capital objects have not risen equally owing to the limited field of price controls, the tax is not only imposed upon the money value of the increase in real capital, but also upon the relative increase in the money value of capital. Thus movables have to be estimated at the acquisition price. This was decided in view of the control possibilities offered by information obtainable from salesmen, auctioneers, fire insurances, antique insurances, deeds of division of property and legacy files.

The increase in value of immovables which do not belong to the capital of a firm is limited to a maximum of 20 per cent of the acquisition value, to which the increase in value through rebuilding and renovation is added. The increase in the value of the capital of a firm, including immovables and participations and excluding shares and claims in foreign currency, has been fixed at 10 per cent of the value on May 1st 1940. This last provision has been stipulated because the normal taxes on trading profits have already removed part of the increase in value. This does not, of course, apply to those goods which are not an inherent part of the capital. Goods which are to be replaced are, however, included in the final capital (cases of war damage excepted) up to the full amount of the sums reserved for purposes of replacement. The considerable increase in replacement prices causes those who have not yet replaced their goods to pay much more than those who have been fortunate enough to be able to do so already.

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[1] There was a property tax in May 1940, and this tax still exists. It is distinct from the post-war capital levy.

Because hidden reserves of 1940 were not taken into account in the capital tax form valid in 1940, according to which the initial capital is fixed, an extra 5 per cent may be added to this initial capital. This again introduces an arbitrary element and may lead to inequalities.

The greatest difficulty was caused by the valuation of shares, partly because the Amsterdam Stock Exchange was not yet re-opened on December 31st, 1945. Some time ago a price list of shares was published which was to be used to calculate the final capital. This list was mainly based on quotations at the Stock Exchange during October 1946. It is questionable, however, whether these quotations give a real estimate of the value of these shares.

In order to prevent a considerable amount of capital increases from being concealed by numerous small donations, the relevant tax has been imposed upon the donor, the recipient being tax free. On the other hand heirs or legatees are taxed, but only in so far as capital increase has been placed within the legacy or inheritance.

For individuals and corporate bodies a few tax exemptions have been allowed, for example if some shares were rated below their real value on May 1st, 1940. Individuals can also be granted tax exemption up to an amount of fl. 10,000, if they can prove that if the war had not taken place they would have been in a position to save this amount.

This brief summary of the taxation measures shows how complicated and how difficult it was to carry out the capital profits taxation programme. As its rate is relatively high (it varies from 50 to 70 per cent) the taxpayers will exhaust all the legal possibilities of evading the fiscal authorities. The intricacy of the regulations quite often helps them in their attempts.

The proceeds of the capital increase tax are estimated at fl. 3.5 milliard (about fl. 2 milliard forthcoming from individuals and fl. 1.5 milliard from corporate bodies). The total of blocked capital moved around the fl. 6.8 milliard mark during 1946 and the beginning of 1947. Therefore a separate capital levy is necessary to skim part of the blocked amounts left after the capital profits tax has been imposed. This new levy was obviously less intricate than the capital profits tax had to be. A single levy is at a disadvantage when compared to a continuous capital tax; for it is impossible to evade a continuous tax over periods and also because those capital components which have remained hidden for a considerable period will have to be brought to light.

Individuals are the only payers of the straight capital levy. Both individuals and corporate bodies pay the capital profits tax. The reason for this difference in treatment lies in the fact that companies can be considered not so much individual capital owners as independent producers of income.

The valuation standards applied to the single levy are nearly the same as those applied to the capital profits tax. The base is the capital on January 1st, 1946, that is to say the final capital after the capital profits tax has been deducted from it. The rates vary from 8 per cent for capital below fl. 100,000 to 20 per cent for the part above fl. 1 million. The following amounts are exempted : for bachelors fl. 8,000, for married persons fl. 12,000, and for each child under age fl. 4,000. As capital possessions are spread rather evenly in Holland and the ' low income classes ' hold a considerable part of these possessions, it is expected that the proceeds will be fairly low; they are estimated at about fl. 1.5 milliard.

4. The Financing of the Levy

It is clear that many taxpayers do not possess sufficiently large blocked amounts or state securities to pay their levy. On the other hand there are numerous holders of blocked accounts who are not, or not for the full amount, liable to pay the levy. If the first category paid its levy by means of credits, with the help given by the money-creating institutions, then the aim of the monetary reform would not be achieved. The second category of citizens would then be left with their blocked assets. An arrangement has been made enabling blocked capital to be exchanged for real capital components. However, it is feared that the debt paper thus created could turn out to augment money in circulation if it was not blocked. In order to prevent this effect, the goods which are obtained through such an exchange are not to be mortgaged, transferred or redeemed during the next three or five years.

The estimate of the total proceeds of both levies shows already that probably a considerable amount will be left as blocked capital. The holders of such capital have in the long run several ways of getting rid of their blocked money. Entrepreneurs can subscribe to so-called investment certificates, which will be negotiable after five years have elapsed. In case of an immediate need of money they are allowed to negotiate these certificates at once. This measure has the effect of a forced state loan. Small savers can subscribe to a savings account with a savings bank. One-fifth of this amount will be transferred to a free account every year.

As the amount of free money has, since the money blocking in September 1945, again reached the level sufficient to finance the current national income, it is not out of the question that the de-blocking which has been described will lead to inflationary pressure unless real output rises substantially during this period.

Blocked accounts left after the levy will thus gradually be de-blocked or turned into investment certificates. How big this amount will be cannot easily be foreseen, because part of the levies will quite possibly be paid in free money. The first results of the cashing of the capital increase tax showed that about 25 per cent was paid in free money (but the capital exchange possibilities were only granted recently). A payment in ' free ' money may be financed *via* the money-creating institutions. Only a strict control of the credit policy of the banking system can prevent this undesirable monetary effect. In practice it is, however, difficult for the banks to differentiate between credit needs to finance a payment of taxes and other needs.

On balance, the results are not unsatisfactory. The considerable floating purchasing power available at the liberation, which endangered a sound financial recovery, has been blocked for a long period, just when goods were scarcest. This is one of the reasons why uncontrolled inflation has been staved off. The levies should only be seen as complements to the monetary reform; they serve only to redistribute real capital.

A balanced budget, before the capital levy, might have been sufficient for a deflationary effect, but to balance the budget was not possible for the Dutch Government in the post-war period of transition.

DR. D. B. J. SCHOUTEN.

TABULAR APPENDIX

EDITORIAL NOTE

Tables comparing the broad trends of production, prices and wages, the volume of foreign trade and the supply of coal for a number of European countries, the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. are given below. For some countries more up-to-date figures are available than for others. These time lags will, it is hoped, be reduced in future and the tables will be extended when more information becomes available. The index numbers are based as far as possible on 1938.

Explanation of symbols:

... the figure is not available.
( ) figures provisional or approximate.
— figure is negligible.

TABLE I. *Industrial Production (or Employment)*
Index Number: 1938=100

Index Numbers	Monthly Averages 1939	1945	1946	1947	1947 June	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	1948 Jan.	Feb.
Industrial Production[1] ...											
U.S.A.[2]	122	228	191	210	207	210	213	216	216	217	217
United Kingdom[3]	...	...	100	109	116	116	121	123	115	118	214
France[4]	...	46	81	95	97	97	100	97	90	...	...
Belgium	105	38	88	105	104	103	112	114	112		
Netherlands	111	30	73	92	91	96	109	104	101	101	...
Denmark	105	74	97	112	109	116	117	118	120	123	125
Sweden	106	91	110	111	112	110	111	111	110	110	
Norway[4]	107	69	100	115	122	120	122	124	115	117	132
Finland[5]	...	52	70	86	82	87	89	98	99	...	...
Poland[6]	...	...	79		103	108	111	...		...	...
Bulgaria	106	...	122	141	151	149	172	173	154	...	...
Italy[7]	100	...	47	61	68	73	72	68	64	61	...
Germany:[8]											
British Zone	...	...	31	35	34	38	39	40	40	40	...
American Zone	...	...	37	46	48	48	50	51		49	...
Austria[9]			58	71	77	73	75	76	79	84	...
Industrial Employment:											
Switzerland[10]	98	110	123	134	132	134	...	...	136	...	...
Czechoslovakia[11]	...	...	86	...	94	98	100	...	...	...	...
Great Britain[12]	100	100	97	104	104	105	106	106	106	107	107

Sources: Official Statistics. For *Belgium*: Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales, Louvain; for *Sweden*: Sveriges Industriförbund; for *Finland*: Unitas; for *Germany*: Control Commission (British Element); for *Italy*: Confederazione Generale del' Industria Italiana; for *Austria*: Monatsberichte des Oest. Institutes für Wirtschaftsforschung.

[1] Mining and Manufacturing, except Denmark (manufacturing only), and Netherlands (mining, manufacturing and public utilities).

[2] Adjusted for seasonal variations.

[3] Interim Index of industrial production, 1946=100.

[4] Adjusted for number of working days.

[5] Total (export and home) industry; seasonally adjusted.

[6] Output of national enterprises and of enterprises under state control.

[7] 1939=100 provisional figures. [8] 1936=100.

[9] Industrial key materials, 1937=100.

[10] Wage earners employed in manufacturing and building. Quarterly figures.

[11] Total employment in manufacturing, mining and building, 1937=100.

[12] Employment (incl. employers and self-employed) in manufacturing. June 1939=100; all annual figures refer to June.

TABLE II

Wholesale Prices[1]
Index Numbers : 1938=100

Index Numbers		Monthly Averages				1947					1948	
		1939	1945	1946	1947	June	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.
U.S.A.	a[2]	98	135	154	193	188	200	202	203	208	211	204
U.K.	a	101	167	173	189	187	193	197	200	201	209	214
	b[3]	91.5	138	142	155	154	159	162	165	165	172	176
France	a	105	375	648	989	904	1096	1129	1211	1217	1463	1537
	b	92	(275)	189	289	265	319	328	352	355	427	449
Holland	a	102	177	245	266	264	267	268	272	274	273	...
	b	99	(122)	169	183	181	183	184	187	188	...	...
Switzerland ...	a	104	206	201	209	208	210	215	217	218	220	220
	b	103	...	204	213	212	214	219	221	222	224	224
Sweden	a	103	174	168	179	180	180	182	184	185	186	187
	b	98	...	173	199	199	199	201	203	204	205	206
Denmark ...	a	105	190	188	207	205	209	209	213	216	216	216
	b	98	...	180	198	196	200	200	205	207	207	207
Norway	a	102	177	168	175	175	178	178	178	178	180	180
	b	97	...	138	144	144	147	147	147	147	148	148
Finland	a	106	386	605	724	685	756	774	849	886	900	906
	b	98	...	207	248	235	259	265	291	304	309	311
Czechoslovakia ...	a	115	173	295	313	307	315	319	318	318	322	322
	b	114	...	170	181	178	183	185	184	184	187	187
Italy	a	...	...	...	5158	5329	6202	6010	5647	5544	5391	...

[1] Prices expressed in national currencies and in U.S. dollars at official rates.
[2] a=in national currency. [3] b=in U.S. currency.

TABLE III

Wages

Index Numbers[1]	Monthly Averages				1947					1948
	1939	1945	1946	1947	June	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.
U.S.A.[2]	101	163	173	195	196	199	200	202	204	206
United Kingdom[3] ...	...	149	161	168	166	169	170	173	173	174
Switzerland[4] ...	100	146	160	174	...	...	...	178	...	...
France[5]	...	328	448	525	...	...	525	...	...	...
Netherlands[6] ...	100	131	163	168	167	170	171	173	174	...
Czechoslovakia[7] ...	100	182	304	314	315	317	317	317	317	...

[1] Base periods : U.S.A. and France : 1938=100 ; United Kingdom : September 1939=100 ; Switzerland : Jan.–August 1939=100 ; Netherlands : 1938–9=100 ; Czechoslovakia : March 1939=100.

[2] Average hourly earnings in manufacturing.

[3] Weekly wage rates ; Ministry of Labour (all industries).

[4] Hourly rates in industry ; quarterly figures.

[5] Hourly rates for men in Paris. The annual figures refer to October.

[6] Hourly rates in industry. [7] Hourly rates in manufacturing.

TABLE IV

Foreign Trade
Volume Index (Deflated Values: 1938=100)

Index Numbers		Monthly Averages				1947					1948
		1939	1945	1946	1947	June	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.
U.S.A.	Imports	114	130	139	133	130	135	145	126	152	
	All Exports	105	183	191	238	246	216	237	216	210	
U.K.	Imports	97	62	69	77	77[1]	88[2]	...	...	77[3]	
	Exports	94	46	99	108	102[1]	114[2]	...	...	117[3]	128
France	Imports	88	34	112	117	132	109	107	101	98	
	Exports	99	10	43	82	92	74	89	83	79	
Switzerland	Imports	118	31	105	147	148	139	158	168	178	173
	Exports	97	57	101	115	126	117	122	111	145	97
Denmark	Imports	98	21	86	82	121	90	95	72	86	68
	Exports	101	32	60	68	72	70	67	72	72	54
Sweden	Imports	109	21	67	...	114	133	124	102	...	...
	Exports	106	56	78	...	87	88	105	89	...	...
Norway	Imports	111	46	78	118	146	153	118	87	112	71
	Exports	108	19	61	81	113	86	86	79	77	84
Poland	Imports[4]	...	97[5]	160	128	233	135	135	111	125	...
	Exports	...	17[5]	34	52	67	61	64	57	67	...
Finland	Imports	86	12	35	(56)	49	58	59	60	65	...
	Exports	95	17	45	(55)	57	60	60	60	60	...
Hungary	Imports	...	1	16	52	53	56	88	52	49	62
	Exports	...	...	15	26	27	25	24	28	41	35

[1] Average of 2nd quarter. [2] Average of 3rd quarter. [3] Average of 4th quarter.
[4] Incl. U.N.R.R.A. deliveries. [5] Monthly average of 3rd and 4th quarter.

TABLE V

Production of Steel (Ingots and Castings)

Thousand metric tons	Monthly Averages				1947					1948	
	1937	1938	1946	1947	June	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.
U.S.A. ...	4282	2400	5035	6410	6322	6159	6859	6562	6682	6770	6296
Great Britain	1101	881	1074	1057	1032	1081	1397[1]	1110	1234[1]	1142	1175
France ...	660	518	367	479	463	530	568	416	408	552	556
Belgium ...	322	190	190	241	232	209	293	265	296	314	...
Luxembourg...	209	120	108	143	147	165	175	156	168	166	170
Sweden ...	94	83	101	99	95	94	104	99	117	103	...
Poland ...	122	120	102	132	127	143	145	148	140	148	140
Czechoslovakia	192	153	139	190	186	197	212	199	191	216	205
Hungary ...	55.4	54.0	29.4	49.7	50.3	54.3	59.8	52.9	50.8	59.8	...
Italy ...	175	194	96	142	159	147	163	156	143	...	...
Austria ...	54.1	...	15.6	29.7	28.6	34.2	36.8	35.8	40.5	47.0	46.8
Germany:											
British Zone	...	...	198	232	209	255	293	273	271	287	...
U.S. Zone	59[2]	...	21	32	31	35	41	41	39	39	...

Source: U.N.O. Monthly Bulletin and other official statistics.
[1] Five weeks. [2] 1936.

TABLE VI

Coalmining and Supplies

A. Hard Coal Output

Monthly Figures or Averages[1]

Million metric tons	Average 1946	Average 1947	1947 July	1947 Oct.	1947 Nov.	1947 Dec.	1948 Jan.	1948 Feb.	Feb. as % of 1935–38
U.S.A.[2]	44.8	51.1	39.9	56.9	51.7	54.6	54.3	48.1	...
United Kingdom ...	16.1	17.0	13.5	16.3	17.3	19.3[4]	19.6[4]	16-7	...
West Germany[3] ...	5.1	6.7	6.9	7.7	7.6	7.4	7.6	...	...
France[2]	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.6	2.5	3.1	4.8	4.3	111
Belgium	1.9	2.0	1.8	2.1	1.9	2.1	2.2	1.7	73
Holland	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	1.0	0.9	79
Poland	3.9	4.9	5.0	5.8	5.4	5.2	5.7	5.2	103
Czechoslovakia ...	1.2	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.4	130

B. Total Imports of Solid Fuels including Bunkers (ton for ton)

Monthly Figures or Averages

Thousand metric tons	Average 1946	Average 1947	1947 July	1947 Oct.	1947 Nov.	1947 Dec.	1948 Jan.	1948 Feb.	Feb. as % of 1935–38
France...	867	1283	1624	985	1497	1507	1234	1467	73
Belgium	262	462	396	617	556	674	473	421	80
Holland	268	330	365	345	258	311	220	300	43
Luxembourg ...	154	187	217	223	187	204	233	231	91
Norway	157	203	296	189	187	127	77	110	43
Denmark	314	363	442	388	327	293	294	240	51
Sweden	287	495	755	693	642	657	542	490	75
Switzerland	128	210	212	270	260	284	273	199	73
Italy	471	749	905	863	686	759	673	380	35
Finland	68	132	190	226	217	230	124	43	30
Portugal	48	76	105	77	59	50	47	53	49

C. Exports of Solid Fuels excluding Bunkers (ton for ton)

Monthly Figures or Averages

Thousand metric tons	Average 1946	Average 1947	1947 June	1947 Sept.	1947 Oct.	1947 Nov.	1947 Dec.	1948 Jan.	Jan. as % of 1935–38
U.S.A.	4105	5919	7562	7313	7173	6218	4626	...	...
Thereof to Europe ...	1370	2811	3380	3837	3862	2987	2861	2307	...
U.K.	385	94	75	117	84	65	161	293	9
West Germany ...	1089	995	1132	1076	1108	1056	1564	...	...
Poland	1277	1900	2178	2381	2112	2009	2119	2210	...
Czechoslovakia ...	55	131	115	149	128	145	177	...	53[5]
France...	32	38	43	42	49	27	9	6	6
Belgium	78	172	171	225	200	157	148	123	24
Holland	36	48	61	48	50	59	91	108	22

Source : European Coal Organisation ; United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics.

[1] Calendar months. [2] Incl. a small quantity of lignite.

[3] British and French zones. [4] Five weeks ; other months four weeks. [5] December.